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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the Ninth Circuit err by concluding that the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996 is content-based, rather than content-neutral, based upon its 
secondary effects to prevent the abuse of children and the proliferation of the 
child pornography market?
2. If the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 is held to be content-based, is 
the statute narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interest in 
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of children and the 
termination of the child pornography market, under a strict scrutiny standard?
3. Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996 is overbroad, while the material covered by the statute will largely include 
sexually explicit images of pre-pubescent children, and that any overbreadth can 
be cured on a case-by-case basis?
4. Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996 is void for vagueness even though it gives a person of reasonable 
intelligence adequate notice and enforcement is based on objective standards?
5. Should First Amendment protection extend to virtual child pornography, which is 
an obscene form of speech that has no social value?
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No. 00-795
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Fall Term of2001
John Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.. 
Petitioner,
V.
The Free Speech Coalition, et al.. 
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, the Attorney General of the United States, respectftilly submit this brief and 
request that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit that the language “appears to be a minor” and the language “conveys the 
impression” is unconstitutional and should be severed from the statute.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United Slates Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198 
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Elder v. Holloway. 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On January 27, 1997, The Free Speech Coalition on its own behalf and on the behalf of 
its members. Bold Type, Inc., Jim Gingerich and Ron Raffaelli (“The Free Speech Coalition”), 
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 
( CPPA ). (J.A. 1.) The Free Speech Coalition is a trade association that represents more than 
600 businesses and individuals involved in the production, distribution, sale and presentation of 
adult oriented materials. (J.A. 3.) Bold Type, Inc. is a publisher of a book entitled “California’s 
Nude Beaches, a publication “dedicated to the education and expression of the ideals and 
philosophy associated with nudism.” (J.A. 3.) Jim Gingerich is a New York artist whose 
paintings include large-scale nudes; and Ron Raffaelli is a professional photographer 
specializing in erotic photography. (J.A. 3.)
The Respondents filed suit in the Northern District of California asserting a pre­
enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A, 2256. (J.A. 70.) The Free Speech Coalition 
alleged that these provisions were vague, overbroad and constituted impermissible content- 
specific regulations and prior restraints on free speech. (J.A. 70.) Both parties, then moved for 
summary Judgment. (J.A. 70.) However, on August 12,1997, the district court granted the 
government’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the Act was consistent with the
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First Amendment. (J.A. 85.) The district court held that the CPPA was content-neutral and not 
content-specific and therefore did not intend to regulate speech because of government 
disagreement with the message being conveyed. (J.A. 76.) The CPPA was instead passed to 
prevent the secondary effects of the child pornography industry, including the “exploitation and 
degradation of children and the encouragement of pedophilia and molestation of children.” (J.A. 
76.) The court also found that the CPPA was not vague or overbroad, and did not constitute an 
improper prior restraint on speech. (J.A. 81-84.) Finally, the district court also found that the 
CPPA’s affirmative defense did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to a defendant by 
virtue of an unconstitutional presumption. (J.A. 83.) The district court, therefore, denied the 
Free Speech Coalition’s cross motion for summary judgment. (J.A. 85.)
On August 13, 1997, the Free Speech Coalition, appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from this final judgment. (J.A. 87.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed in 
part on the questions of standing and prior restraint. (J.A. 10.) The judgment was reversed on 
the questions of unconstitutionality of the statutory language “appears to be a minor” and 
“conveys the impression”. (J.A. 10.) The case was therefore remanded to the district court on 
December 17, 1999. (J.A. 10.) The Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court on November 16, 2000. (J.A. 114.) This Court granted certiorari 
on January 22, 2001. (J.A. 114.)
Statement of the Facts
For more than two decades, Congress has enacted and amended legislation designed to 
eliminate the scourge of child pornography by prohibiting the possession, production and 
distribution of materials depicting children in a sexually explicit manner. (J.A. 49.) The history 
of this effort, however, had been plagued with examples of child pomographers finding
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loopholes within the legislation so that they would not be prosecuted. (J.A. 49.) To close these 
loopholes, the original federal legislation has been amended many times since it was enacted as 
the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. The Free Speech Coalition, 
et al. V. Reno, et al.. 198 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999). The original act was passed to 
criminalize the production of child pornography. Yet, the legislation had many problems, 
considering that only one person was ever convicted under the Act’s production prohibition. W.
Congress subsequently passed the Child Protection Act of 1984, which expanded the 
1977 Act. Id. at 1088. The expansion was a consequence of the 1977 Act’s deficiencies and as a 
response to the Supreme Court ruling in New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Supreme 
Court held in this case that child pornography would not have to meet the Miller obscenity 
standard to be prohibited. Id at 747. Essentially, the Court decided that the compelling interest 
in protecting children would almost always outweigh First Amendment interests, thereby 
justifying a categorical denial of First Amendment protection to child pornography in most cases. 
Id at 748.
Therefore, the 1984 amendment codified the Ferber rule that child pornography need not 
meet the obscenity standard The Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1087. The Child Protection 
Act also raised the age limit for protecting children involved from sixteen years to eighteen 
years. Id The 1984 statute also did away with the requirement that the material have to be for 
the purpose of sale. The Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1087. Finally, the act imposed 
F^rber’s "visual depiction" language, thereby greatly extending the reach of the anti-child 
pornography statute. Id In the 1980s, Congress made two additional amendments to the statute 
that further extended its reach to the advertisement of child pornography and the use of computer 
technology for the transportation of child pornography. Id
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The 1990s brought some of the most significant strides in the crusade against child 
pornography. The Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1087. Following the Supreme Court's 
landmark decision in Osborne v. Ohio. Congress further toughened the statute, making the 
possession of three or more pieces of child pornography a federal crime in the Child Protection 
Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990. W. The principal holding in Osborne v. 
Ohio sustained a state statute banning even possession or viewing of child pornography on the 
basis of the state’s compelling interest in maintaining the physical and emotional safety of 
children, and ultimately eradicating the child pornography market. 496 U.S. 103, 110 (1990). 
Tliere were more changes to the statute in 1994, including punishment for the production and 
importation of sexually explicit depictions of a minor and restitution for victims. The Free 
Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1088-89.
Legislation has therefore tracked Supreme Court decisions and the swift development of 
technology and its infinite possibilities. Id. In recent years, computer technology has given yet 
another loophole to pomographers so that they may create synthetic child pornography that is 
virtually indistinguishable from real child pornography. (J.A. 49.) Congress considered 
extensive testimony and documents and found that there is a link between computer-generated 
child pornography, of such quality that it is indistinguishable from a depiction of an actual child, 
and harm to children. (J.A. 71.) Therefore, on September 30, 1996, the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”), was enacted to address the Government’s ongoing fight 
against child pornography. (J.A. 70.) This Act amends Title 18, Chapter 110 of the United 
States Code by adding section 2252A. (J.A. 26.) The Act also revised section 2251, 2252, and 
2256. Congress passed this legislation, because it recognized that the danger of child 
pornography is not limited to the effects on children actually used in the pornography. (J.A. 71.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
because the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 does not violate the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. The CPPA is content-neutral and does not violate judicial 
standards of overbreadth and vagueness. The CPPA constitutes a content-neutral statute because 
it is designed to prevent the secondary effects of child pornography on children. The CPPA 
advances substantial government interests in aiming to safeguard the physical and psychological 
well-being of children. Moreover, despite the CPPA’s regulation of child pornography, the 
CPPA reasonably permits alternative avenues of communication.
Even if the CPPA is content-based, compelling government interests Justify the act under 
a standard of strict scrutiny. Consequently, the CPPA is narrowly tailored in the least restrictive 
means possible to advance compelling government interests. In addition, this Court has never 
held that the government’s interest in regulating child pornography is limited to visual depictions 
of real children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision stands 
in stark contrast to the decisions holding the CPPA constitutional from the First, Fourth, Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits.
The prevention of the sexual exploitation of children, resulting from child pornography, 
constitutes a substantial and compelling government interest. The Ninth Circuit erred by holding 
that compelling and substantial government interests exist only when child pornography contains 
images of actual children. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit failed to give proper deference to 
Congressional findings. In adopting the CPPA, Congress aims to regulate visual depictions of 
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct virtually indistinguishable from pornography 
depicting real children in sexually explicit conduct.
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The CPPA is not substantially overbroad in light of the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. The 
“appears to be” and “conveys the impression” language of the CPPA is narrowly aimed at 
regulating images that are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from photographs 
of actual children engaged in identical sexual conduct. In light of the CPPA’s legitimate aim in 
regulating real and virtual child pornography, the possibility of educational, medical or artistic 
works falling within the statute’s reach is minimal as these circumstances will be cured by a 
case-by-case analysis. In fact, the affirmative defense and scienter requirement of the CPPA 
illustrate Congress’s intention to narrowly regulate only the images indistinguishable from 
images depicting actual children.
The CPPA is not void under the First Amendment because of vagueness. Not only does 
the CPPA provide adequate notice, it provides for objective enforcement by law enforcement. 
The CPPA defines the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness in that an ordinary person can 
understand what conduct is prohibited. Additionally, the CPPA does not encourage arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement because an objective standard will be applied in determining 
whether visual depictions violate the CPPA. Moreover, the scienter requirement and the 
affirmative defense provide protections against arbitrary enforcement by authorities. 
Consequently, this Court should find the CPPA constitutional under the First Amendment in 
recognizing that the sexual exploitation of children is a real threat to the well-being of America’s 
children.
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ARGUMENT
L THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT OF 1996 IS CONTENT- 
NEUTRAL BECAUSE IT ADVANCES SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENT 
INTERESTS WITHOUT UNREASONABLY LIMITTING ALTERNATIVE 
AVENUES OF COMMUNICATION.
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 expands the government’s efforts in 
combating the use of computer technology to produce child pornography containing images 
virtually indistinguishable from real children. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. section 2256(8)(B) bans 
visual depictions that appear to be minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and section 
2256(8)(D) bans visual depictions advertised, promoted, presented, described or distributed in 
such a manner that conveys the impression that the materials contain sexually explicit images of 
children. Accordingly, a federal statute that regulates child pornography must pass constitutional 
muster under the guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court. That inquiry requires a 
determination of whether this reguFtion is content-neutral or content-based. As a content- 
neutral regulation, the CPPA passes constitutional bars.
The CPPA Is Content-Neutral Because It Is Designed To Prevent The Secondary
Effects Of Child Pornography On Children.
A federal regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is 
content-neutral despite any incidental effects on speakers and messages. Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Accordingly, the principal inquiry focuses on whether the 
government adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it 
conveys. Id. “The government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner 
of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
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that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Ward. 
491 U.S.at791.
This Coux i upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance aimed at preventing the secondary 
effects associated with sexually explicit material in City of Renton, et al. v. Playtime Theatres. 
Inc., et al.. 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). In Renton, a zoning ordinance prohibited adult motion 
picture theatres from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone including family 
dwelling, church, park or school. Id at 43. Reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit, this 
Court held that the ordinance was not aimed at the content of the films shown at the theatres but 
at the secondary effects of such theaters in preventing crime, protecting the quality of the city’s 
neighborhoods and preserving the quality of urban life. Id at 47-48. Moreover, this Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a similar city zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult 
motion picture theatres in Young, et al. v. American Mini Theatres. Inc., et al.. 427 U.S. 50, 71- 
72 (1976). This Court held that zoning ordinances designed to prevent the secondary effects of a 
business catering in sexually explicit materials constitute a content-neutral regulation. Id at 63.
Here, this Court should conclude that the CPPA constitutes a content-neutral regulation 
because Congress is regulating sexually explicit material in order to combat secondary effects.
In passing the CPPA, Congress attempted to regulate a subcategory of pornography not to 
suppress the expression of unpopular views but to prevent the secondary effects of child 
pornography. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2 (Aug. 27, 1996). If the CPPA targets child 
pornography, it is due to the effect of the pornography on innocent children, not the nature of the 
materials themselves, especially if that pornography contains computer-generated images of 
children. id Congress foimd that “child pornography is often used as part of a method of 
seducing other children into sexual activity,” and that “child pornography is often used by
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pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate their own sexual appetites.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, 
at 2. Furthermore, the effect of visual depictions of child sexual activity on child molesters, 
pedophiles or innocent children “is the same whether the child pornography consists of 
photographic depictions of actual children or visual depictions ... which are virtually 
indistinguishable ... from photographic images of actual children.” Id. Hence, in adopting the 
CPPA, Congress endeavored to protect “the physical and mental health, safety and well-being of 
our children” from the serious threat of child pornography. Id. at 7. Therefore, in serving to 
curb the secondary effects of child pornography on children, the CPPA represents a content- 
neutral regulation as a reasonable restriction on the time, place and manner of pornography 
without reference to its content.
Congress enacted the CPPA to combat the correlation between child pornography and the 
sexual exploitation of children, id. at 2. The CPPA focuses on how child abusers use child 
pornography to seduce children and how child abusers use child pornography to learn sexually 
deviant behavior. Id. Moreover, the CPPA focuses on the secondary effect of actual physical 
harm to a child from the use of child pornography. Id. Congress’s findings concern the 
secondary effects of child pornography rather than the direct impact of child pornography. 
Hence, the prevention of secondary effects renders the CPPA content-neutral.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit erred by holding that the CPPA represented a content- 
based classification of speech aimed at curbing a particular category of expression. The district 
court found that Congress passed the CPPA in order to prevent the secondary effects of the child 
pornography industry, including the exploitation and degradation of children and the 
encouragement of pedophilia and molestation of children. The Free Speech Coalition, et al. v. 
Reno, ct al.. 198 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999). The failure of the Ninth Circuit to recognize
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Congress’s purpose in adopting the CPPA signifies a lack of concern towards the government’s 
substantial interest in protecting children from the secondary effects of child pornography. 
Therefore, this Court should conclude chat Congress passed the CPPA to prevent the secondary 
effects of child pornography.
B. As A Content-Neutral Regulation. The CPPA Is Narrowly Tailored To Advance
Substantial Government Interests In Aiming To Safeguard The Physical And
Psychological Well-Being Of Children.
Once a court deems a regulation content-neutral, the inquiry turns to whether the 
regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. Ward. 491 U.S. at 791. 
“A content neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances 
important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden 
substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broadcasting 
System. Inc., et al. v. FCC. et al.. 520 U.S. 180,189 (1997). A statute will meet the narrowly 
tailored requirement if a substantial portion of the burden it imposes furthers the government’s 
interest, even though a less intrusive alternative might also exist. American Library Assn., et al. 
V. Reno. 33 F.3d 78, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Although the effects of a content-neutral regulation 
may be substantial, if they are incidental and largely unavoidable, they will pass constitutional 
muster. Id. at 87-88. This requirement is met so long as the regulation promotes a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. U.S. v. 
Albertini. 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). In addition, the mere assertion of possible self-censorship 
resulting from a statute fails to render an antiobscenity law unconstitutional. Fort Wayne Books. 
Inc, v. Ind.. 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989).
This Court upheld the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that prohibited the possession 
or yiewing of child pornography because the utilization of child pornography in order to seduce
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children constituted a secondary effect. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). Relying on 
the findings of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, this Court held that 
regulating child pornography represents a compelling government interest because pedophiles 
use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.” Id. As in Osborne, the 
CPPA regulates child pornography to serve government interests. In adopting the CPPA, 
Congress found that “child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other 
children into sexual activity.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. Hence, the CPPA protects children from 
the sexual abuse and exploitation of children.
The govemmenf s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor constitutes a substantial government interest, even a compelling interest. New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982). This Court sustained legislation aimed at protecting the 
physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the law operated in the sensitive area of 
constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 757. In Ferber. this Court upheld the constitutionality of 
a New York criminal statute that prohibited persons from knowingly promoting and distributing 
materials depicting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen without a showing 
of obscenity. Id. at 749. Secondly, this Court held that the distribution of photographs and films 
depicting sexual activity by juveniles intrinsically relates to the sexual abuse of children. Id. at 
759. Thirdly, this Court held that to further prevent the production of child pornography the 
advertising and selling, effectively the market, of child pornography must be eradicated. Id. at 
761. Finally, this Court held that the value of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 762. These substantial interests 
justified New York’s regulation of child pornography.
12
I
Here, the CPPA endorses the same justifications that this Court deemed dispositive in 
upholding the constitutionality of New York’s regulation in Ferber. Congressional findings 
Justify the CPPA’s prohibitions of real and virtual child pornography with substantial 
government interests. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. Specifically, Congress found that child 
pornography, whether utilizing real or virtual children in sexually explicit conduct, is used to 
seduce other children to participate m sexually explicit activity. Id. Child pornography can 
convince a reluctant child to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to pose for sexually 
explicit photographs. Id. Also, sexually explicit conduct of real or virtual children stimulates 
and whets the sexual appetites of pedophiles and child abusers. W. Child pornography 
desensitizes a viewer to the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children. Id. Therefore, 
after weighing the evidence, Congress concluded that computer-generated children depicted in 
sexually explicit conduct posed just as viable a threat to the sexual exploitation of children as 
real children involved in sexually explicit conduct. Id. Thus, Congress determined that the 
physical and psychological well-being of children represents a substantial, indeed compelling, 
interest.
These substantial and even compelling interests illustrate that child pornography, whether 
utilizing virtual or real children, is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children. In a child 
pornography case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the defendant “used his computer to expose 
his child victims to various sexual stimulants to lure them into sexual activities and pornography 
production.” U.S. v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201,1203 (10th Cir. 2001). Defendant showed his child 
victims sexually explicit imagery both before and after their participation in sexually explicit 
conduct fully expecting that such pemographic images would entice his victims to engage in this 
illicit sexual conduct with each other or with him. Reaves> 253 F.3d at 1203. In another child
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pornography case, the defendant allowed his child victims access to his computer to view other 
children in sexual situations. U.S. v. Brown. 237 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit
concluded “in using the computer to desensitize his victims to deviant sexual activity, he was 
using it to solicit participation in that activity.” Id. at 629. Hence, Congress enacted the CPPA 
to address the documented concern that child pornography intrinsically relates to the sexual 
abuse of children. Sen. Rpt 104-358, at 2.
Furthermore, Congress enacted the CPPA to destroy the network and market of child 
pornography. Congress concluded that the elimination of child pornography necessarily includes 
the elimination of the distribution network for child pornography. Id at 20. This Court held that 
states are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children 
because “the advertising and selling of child pornography provide[sl an economic motive for and 
[is] thus an integral part of the production of such materials.” Ferber. 458 U.S. at 761. Hence, 
the market for child pornography plays a critical role in the vicious cycle of child sexual abuse 
and exploitation whether utilizing real or computer-generated children in sexually explicit 
conduct. The CPPA also serves to update federal law to keep pace with the technology of 
pornography. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 20. Pedophiles who possess pornographic depictions of 
actual children will go free from punishment by statutes prohibiting the possession of child 
pornography produced using actual children due to the government’s inability to detect or prove 
the use of real children in the production of child pornography. Id. Thus, the enforcement of 
existing laws against the sexual exploitation of children requires the adoption of the CPPA.
Moreover, the CPPA represents a narrowly tailored statute serving significant 
governmental interests. The district court held that the CPPA burdens no more speech than 
necessary in order to protect children from the harms of child pornography. The Free Speech
i
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Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1095-96. For example, the CPPA specifically defines sexually explicit 
conduct and child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000). The affirmative defense allowed 
under the CPPA resolves any ambiguity regarding the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the 
impression.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000). The affirmative defense limits the scope of the 
CPPA by removing from its range of criminal behavior the exact type of activity in which 
plaintiffs claim to engage. The Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1086-87. Works that do not 
involve actual children and are not marketed or advertised as works featuring sexually explicit 
conduct by children lay beyond the scope of the CPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). Congress 
intended that the CPPA not apply to depictions produced using adults engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct even though they may appear to be a minor. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21. Thus, the 
CPPA regulates the narrowest range of materials that might fall within its scope.
C. The CPPA's Regulation Of Child Pornography Reasonably Permits Alternative
Avenues Of Communication.
A content-neutral regulation must not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of 
communication. City of Renton, et al. v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., et al., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986). 
In order to permit adequate avenues of expression, a regulation must permit alternative methods 
of disseminating or possessing the material in question. U.S. v. Hilton. 167 F.3d 61,69 (1st Cir. 
1999). Here, the CPPA permits alternative channels of communication. Although the CPPA 
prohibits the possession of child pornography utilizing real or virtual children, the affirmative 
defense allowed under the CPPA leaves open acceptable alternatives. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). 
Pornography that utilizes actual adults that appear to be minors escapes the reach of the CPPA as 
long as the material was not marketed as child pornography. W. Given the de minimis value of 
child pornography, adult pornography constitutes a reasonable alternative avenue of 
communication as long as not obscene. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 762.
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D. The Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit Erred By Holding That Compelling 
Government Interests Exist Only When Child Pornography Contains Images Of 
Actual Children.
The Court of Appeals for th'^ Ninth Circuit erred by failing to give legitimate recognition 
to the compelling governmental interests that justify the CPPA. The Ninth Circuit held under the 
rationale of Ferber that Congress’s compelling interest in regulating child pornography is 
narrowly limited to sexually explicit materials containing visual images of actual children. The 
Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1092. “Ferber considered the possibility of simulations of 
sexually explicit acts involving non-recognizable minors and implicitly found them to be 
constitutionally protected.” Id. This is an incorrect conclusion. Preventing the sexual abuse and 
exploitation of real children is not the sole justification for Congress’s criminalization of child 
pornography.
Ferber indicates that the government’s interest in regulating child pornography is much 
broader than as the Ninth Circuit held. In Ferber, this Court held that “the prevention of the 
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing 
importance.” 458 U.S. at 757. Ferber did nothing more than place child pornography on the 
same level of First Amendment protection as obscene adult pornography, meaning that its 
production and distribution could be proscribed. Osborne. 495 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded 
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens. Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158, 
168(1944). Furthermore, this Court never explicitly addressed the issue regarding computer­
generated children. In fact, at the time of Ferber. the technology to produce visual depictions of 
child sexual activity indistinguishable from photographs of actual children engaging in sexual 
activity did not exist in 1982. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21. This Court only addressed real children
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involved in child pornography because the respondent sold two films to an undercover police 
officer depicting actual boys masturbating. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 752. The Ninth Circuit misplaced 
the majority’s reliance on the dicta in Ferber hinting at the statute’s limitation to real children. 
This Court wrote that live performances including films, photographs and other visual 
reproductions retained First Amendment protection to prevent works such as sculptures, 
paintings, drawings and cartoons depicting young persons in sexually explicit conduct from 
coming within the scope of the statute. Id. at 765. Hence, this Court made no implicit or explicit 
holdings regarding the regulation of virtual child pornography.
This Court’s reasoning in Osborne and Ferber justified child pornography regulation in 
order to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109; Ferber. 
458 U.S. at 757. The CPPA justifiably regulates child pornography in order to protect children 
from sexual abuse and exploitation. The CPPA aims to prevent the sexual exploitation and 
seduction of real children. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. To a minor or child abuser, it is irrelevant 
whether the minor is viewing actual children or computer-generated children participating in 
sexually explicit conduct. Id. The danger to actual children who are seduced and molested with 
the aid of child pornography is just as great whether utilizing actual or virtual children.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit stands alone in holding the CPPA unconstitutional against 
decisions of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. See U.S. v. Fox. 248 F.3d 394,404 
(5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912,915 (4lh Cir. 2000); Hilton. 167 F.3d at 65; U.S. v. 
Acheson. 195 F.3d 645,648 (11th Cir. 1999). The First Circuit held that the CPPA represents “a 
logical and permissible extension of the rationales in Ferber and Osborne to allow the regulation 
of sexual materials that appear to be of children but did not, in fact, involve the use of live 
children in their production.” Hilton. 167 F.3d at 73. The Fourth Circuit held that the
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government’s interest in stamping out child pornography and denying child abusers access 
extends beyond the protection of the children actually involved in making the pornography.
Mento. 231 F.3d at 920. “The government instead aspires to shield all children from sexual 
exploitation resulting from child pornography.” Id.
E. The Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit Failed To Give Proper Deference To
Congressional Findings.
The Ninth Circuit ignored factual studies that provided evidence for Congress’s findings. 
In fact, the Ninth Circuit independently concluded that factual studies do not yet exist 
establishing a link between computer-generated child pornography and the subsequent sexual 
abuse of children. The Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1093. Instead, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on a single law review article rather than on the well-researched findings of Congress. In 
reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, courts must accord substantial deference to the 
judgments of Congress. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. v. FCC. et al.. 520 U.S. 180,
195 (1997). A court’s sole obligation is to assure that, in formulating its judgments. Congress 
drew reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. Id. A court owes Congress’s findings 
deference in part because the institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and 
evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions. Id. In addition, courts owe 
Congress’s findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise 
the legislative power. Id at 196. Even when the resulting regulation touches on First 
Amendment concerns, a court must give considerable deference in examining the evidence to 
Congress’s findings and conclusions. Id. at 199. A fundamental principle of legislation holds 
that Congress is under no obligation to wait until the entire harm occurs but may act to prevent it. 
Id. at 212. Furthermore, the possibility of drawing inconsistent conclusions from the evidence
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does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence. American Textile 
Mftrs. Institute. Inc, v. Donovan. 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981).
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit failed to determine whether Congress drew reasonable 
inferences based on substantial evidence. Ignoring Congress’s findings altogether, the Ninth 
Circuit replaced Congress’s judgments with its own. In Turner, this Court held that a court is not 
to reweigh the evidence de novo or to replace Congress’s factual predictions with its own. 520 
U.S. at 210. In Ferber. this Court refused to second-guess the legislative findings regarding the 
secondary effects of child pornography. 458 U.S. at 758. Here, substantial evidence reasonably 
supports Congress’s findings. Numerous experts and professionals addressed Congress 
regarding the issue of child pornography: Mrs. Dee Jepsen, Dr. Victor Cline, Dr. Shirley 
O’Brien, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Di Gregory, Mr. Taylor. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 13- 
18. “The best evidence to date suggests that most or all sexual deviations are learned behavior” 
where child molesters and pedophiles use child pornography as a training manual. Id. at 13. Dr. 
O’Brien found a direct relationship existing between pornographic literature and the sexual 
molestation of young children because viewing child pornography desensitizes the child and 
molester. Id. Dr. Cline testified that computer-generated child pornography creates custom- 
tailored pornography which heightens the material’s effect on viewers and subsequently 
increases the threat posed to children. Id, at 16. In 1996, Dr. Cline wrote that to sexual 
predators, the effect is the same whether the child pornography consists of photographic 
depictions of actual children or depictions produced wholly or in part by computer. Id, at 17. 
From this expert testimony. Congress reasonably concluded that child pornography, whether 
utilizing actual or virtual children, poses a significant threat against the safety of children.
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11. EVEN IF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT OF 1996 IS CONTENT- 
BASED, COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTERESTS JUSTIFY THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT UNDER A STANDARD OF STRICT 
SCRUTINY.
“Any restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the content of the speech, is 
a content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.” Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988). If a regulation on speech expressly aims to curb a particular category 
of expression by singling out that type of expression based on its content, then that regulation is 
content-based. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68. Blanket suppression of an entire category of speech 
represents, by its very nature, a content-discriminating act. Id. Even if this Court holds that the 
CPPA is content-based, however, the CPPA still passes constitutional muster because 
compelling government interests justify its restrictions on child pornography.
A. Under A Standard Of Strict Scrutiny. The CPPA Advances Compellina
Government Interests.
A content-based restriction on speech remains constitutional only if the regulation 
represents a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling governmental interest. Consolidated 
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc, v. PSC of N.Y.. 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980). For a content-based statute 
to be constitutional, therefore, one or more compelling state interests must justify the enactment 
of the statute. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68. A content-based statute must pass a standard of strict 
scrutiny in order to be constitutional. Boos. 485 U.S. at 321. “It is not rare that a content-based 
classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that 
vrithin the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly 
outweighs the expressive interests.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763. Moreover, the same governmental 
interests that justify the constitutionality of a content-based statute constitute the same
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governmental interests that justify the constitutionality of a content-neutral statute. Hence, the 
CPPA advances compelling government interests that justify its regulation of child pornography.
The First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits correctly held that the CPPA advances 
compelling government interests. In Hilton, the First Circuit held that under the reasoning of 
Osborne “stamping out child pornography” and “denying pedophiles and would be child abusers 
access to child pornography” constitute compelling government interests. 167 F.3d at 70. 
Moreover, “considerations beyond preventing the direct abuse of actual children can qualify as 
compelling government objectives where child pornography is concerned.” Id. The 
government’s interest in safeguarding the welfare of children against virtual child pornography is 
compelling. Id, at 73. The First Circuit recognized that virtual pornography can be bought, sold 
or traded like real child pomographv and can be used just as effectively in enticing children as 
real child pornography. Id, In Mento. the Fourth Circuit held that the CPPA “aspires to shield 
all children from sexual exploitation resulting from child pornography, and that interest is indeed 
compelling.” 231 F.3dat920. The Fourth Circuit recognized that the connection between 
virtual child pornography and the sexual abuse of children represents just as powerful an interest 
as the causal link that justifies the utter prohibition of pornographic images involving actual 
children. Id,
The Fifth Circuit held that Ferber and Osborne, decided long before the specter of virtual 
child pornography appeared, in no way limited the government’s interests in the area of child 
pornography to the prevention of only the harm suffered by the actual children who participate in 
the production of pornography. Fox, 248 F.3d at 402. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of the CPPA because the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance. Acheson. 195 F.3d at 650. The
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Eleventh Circuit held that “defining child pornography in a manner which captures images that 
‘appear to be’ minors engaged in sexually explicit activity serves the two goals of the Act which 
are the elimination of child pornography and the protection of children from sexual exploitation.” 
Acheson. 195 F.3d at 649. Thus, the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held that the 
CPPA advances compelling govenLnent interests in aiming to safeguard the physical and 
psychological well-being of children.
This Court held that the government’s interest in safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of children constitutes a compelling interest. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756- 
57. In Ferber, this Court also held that regulating the distribution, advertising and selling of 
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles constitutes a compelling interest in 
protecting the well-being of children. Id. at 759, 761. In Osborne, this Court held that 
prohibiting the mere possession and viewing of child pornography constitutes a compelling 
interest in protecting the well-being of children against the use of child pornography to seduce 
children. 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). Hence, the government’s interest in driving child 
pornography from the market through aggressive anti-trafficking laws and prohibiting private 
possession and personal viewing remains justified. Id, Congress’s power to remedy only the 
abuse of children during the process used to produce traditional forms of child pornography 
extends beyond such a limitation. Thus, the CPPA’s prohibition of possession and viewing of 
virtual child pornography constitutes a compelling interest in protecting the well-being of 
children.
The CPPA aims to protect the well-being of children against sexual exploitation and 
abuse from pedophiles and child abusers. Logically, the compelling interest of protecting 
children from sexual exploitation and abuse includes preventing the use of virtual child
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pornography to stimulate the sexual appetites of pedophiles and child abusers. Sen. Rpt. 104- 
358, at 3. This interest includes preventing the seduction or coercion of children into sexual 
activity from the use of virtual child pornography. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73. This interest includes 
destroying the network and market for virtual and real child pornography. Id at 70. This 
interest includes solving the problem of prosecution in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
pornographic image utilized a real child. Id at 73. Congress found that these compelling 
government interests justify the CPPA’s prohibition on pornographic images that appear to be 
minors and convey the impression of minors. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. Therefore, the CPPA 
advances compelling government interests that justify its regulation of child pornography.
B. The CPPA Is Narrowly Tailored In The Least Restrictive Means Possible To
Advance Compelling Government Interests.
In order to pass constitutional muster, a content-based regulation must be narrowly 
tailored in advancing compelling government interests. City of Renton, et al. v. Playtime 
Theatres. Inc., et al.. 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). Congress may regulate protected speech to 
promote compelling governmental interests so long as h selects the least restrictive means to 
further the articulated interest. Sable Communications of Cal.. Inc, v. FCC. 492 U.S. 115, 126 
(1989). Here, the provisions of the CPPA are narrowly tailored. Congress’s statements clearly 
limit the “appear to be” and “conveys the impression” language of the CPPA to visual depictions 
virtually indistinguishable from photographs of actual children engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 2. This intent excludes drawings, cartoons, sculptures and 
paintings depicting children in sexually explicit conduct from the reach of the CPPA. 
Furthermore, the CPPA specifically defines sexually explicit conduct and child pornography. 18 
U.S.C. § 2256 (2000). The CPPA’s affirmative defense further limits the reach of the CPPA to 
child pornography that utilizes real or virtual children in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. §
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2252A(c) (2000). These regulations represent the least restrictive means possible of advancing 
the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Thus, the CPPA aims to prohibit visual depictions of children engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct that is virtually indistinguishable from actual children engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct. Sen. Rpt 104-358, at 2.
III. THE CPPA IS NOT OVERBROAD AND WILL NOT HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT
BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE’S LEGITIMATE SWEEP TO SAFEGUARD THE
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN.
The conclusion that the CPPA of 1996 is a content-neutral statute, aimed at preventing 
the secondary effects emanating from child pornography, does not end the inquiry into the 
CPPA’s constitutionality. ‘’An otherwise constitutional statute may nonetheless violate the First 
Amendment if it is ‘overbroad’ i.e., if it ‘criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally 
protected conduct.’” Osborne. 495 U.S. at 112. However, the CPPA does not criminalize an 
intolerable range of protected speech. The CPPA merely extends the existing prohibitions on 
“real” child pornography to a narrow class of computer-generated pictures that are easily 
mistaken for real photographs of real children. The Free Speech Coalition, et al. v. Reno, et al., 
198 F.3d 1083, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999).
A. The Statute’s Plainly Legitimate Sweep To Stop The Child Pornography Trade
And Subsequent Child Abuse Overrides Anv Qverbreadth Problems.
The overbreadth doctrine should only be used, “as a last resort, and we must construe the 
statute, if at all possible, to avoid constitutional problems.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 613 (1973). In this case, Oklahoma state employees sought a declaration that a state statute 
regulating political activity by state employees, was invalid. Id. at 601. The Court held that the 
statute was not overbroad, and therefore not unconstitutional, stating that.
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[W]e believe that the overbreadth of the statute must not only be real, but 
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. It 
is our view that section 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever 
overbreadth may exist should be cured throu^ case-by-case analysis of the fact 
situations and to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Broadrick. 413 U.S. at 618.
The Court concluded that the statute should not be discarded, “in toto because some 
persons’ arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute.” Id. at 
615. The Court, therefore, held that the statute was constitutional. Id
Likewise, the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held the CPPA to be 
constitutional, because of the government’s interests in deterring the direct abuse of children and 
destroying the illicit child pom trade, was deemed to be legitimate in relation to its overbreadth. 
Hilton. 167 F.3d at 72-73; Mento. 231 F.3d at 921-22; Fox, 248 F.3d at 404-06; Acheson, 195 
F.3d at 650-52. These courts held that the CPPA does not infringe upon or have the potential to 
inftinge upon constitutionally protected speech. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 71. For example, in Hilton, 
the court recognized that the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” language expanded 
the scope of the CPPA to a point where it may capture constitutionally protected speech, 
rendering the statute invalid and chilling protected speech. Id. However, this court and other 
circuit courts held that even though the statute on its face might pose constitutional difficulties. 
Congress’s statements provide, “a precise and limited understanding of the ‘appears to be’ 
language.” M. The court in Hilton ruled that, ‘“[w]here a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other 
of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.’” Id. (quoting United States 
ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909)).
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Therefore, the First Circuit and the other courts of appeal looked to the congressional 
record to determine if the language used in the statute targeted a narrow class of images. Hilton,
167 F.3d at 71. The legislative record aims at a narrow range of images, “which are virtually 
indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from un-retouched photographs of actual children 
engaging in identical sexual conduct.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 7. The “appears to be” language, 
“applies to the same type of photographic images already prohibited, but which does not require 
the use of an actual minor in its production.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358 at 21. The prohibition of child 
pornography was extended from, “photographic depictions of actual minors engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct to the identical type of depiction, one which is virtually indistinguishable from 
the banned photographic depiction.” Id The Senate Reports narrow the statute so that the CPPA 
is constitutional.
The CPPA Is Sufficiently Related To The Substantial, Indeed Compelling,
Government Interest In Safeguarding Children.
However, the Ninth Circuit also held that the, “CPPA is insufficiently related to the 
interest in prohibiting pornography actually involving minors to justify its infringement on 
protected speech.” The court, however, relies on a restrictive reading of Ferber. 458 U.S. 747. 
The Court in Ferber upheld a New York state statute that prohibited the distribution of child 
pornography involving real children in sexually explicit conduct. Id. The Court further ruled 
that, “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government 
objective of surpassing importance.” Id. at 757. In a subsequent case, the Court agreed that the 
goal of child pornography statutes should be “safeguarding the physical and psychological well­
being of children,” and that the extension of this goal should be the termination of the child 
pornography market. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103 at 109. The Court in Ferber and Osborne, 
therefore, agreed that the ultimate goal was the safeguarding of children.
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Recently, however, the government’s goal to safeguard children has been threatened due 
to advances and availability in computer technology. Four circuit courts of appeal permitted the 
extension of Ferber and Osborne’s reasoning to allow the CPPA to regulate pornography that 
contains images that appear to be children or convey the impression that a child was used in 
production. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 73; Menlo 231 F.3dat 921; Acheson 195 F.3d at 651; Fox. 248 
F.3d at 403-404. As the Senate Reports confirm, these “virtual” depictions can be readily used 
to fiirther the child pornography trade and facilitate the seduction and abuse of children. Sen. 
Rpt. 104-358, at 8-9. The legislative history also reports that technology has improved and 
increased so much that it may be impossible to determine whether a real child was used in the 
creation of the images. Id. at 17. The efforts to eradicate the child pornography market would 
be frustrated if the statute did not extend to images that appear to be or convey the impression of 
children. If the government were not allowed to prosecute images that are virtually 
indistinguishable from real images, *hen the alleged pomographer would have a built-in defense 
that the government cannot prove that the image circulating is that of a real individual. 
Technology will hinder the government from doing its job and allow pomographers to go free.
Therefore, the government’s interest in addressing these forms of virtual child 
pornography is no less powerful than when actual children are harmed during production. The 
ultimate goal of safeguarding children, presented in the Supreme Court cases of Ferber and 
Osborne, is also at the heart of the CPPA of 1996.
C. It is Unlikely That Educational. Medical. Or Artistic Work Would Be Within The
Reach Of The CPPA, But Even If Some Protected Speech Were Captured These
Images Could Be Reviewed On A Case-Bv-Case Basis.
It is also not problematic that the CPPA might reach a small amount of protected speech. 
167 F.3d at 71. The Court in Ferber. for example, rejected an overbreadth challenge to a New
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York state statute that prohibited the distribution of child pornography involving real children in 
sexually explicit conduct. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773. The Court held that the statute was, “directed 
at the hard core of child pornography” and it did not view the possibility that some protected 
speech might be covered as a reason to hold the statute invalid. Id The Court explained that 
only a tiny fraction of educational, medical, or artistic work would be within the statute’s reach 
and that if overbreadth did exist in these situations that it should be cured by a “case-by-case 
analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions may not be applied.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 
773-74. The Court in Ferber went on to say that, “if it were necessary for literary or artistic 
value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looks younger could be utilized.” Id. at 763. 
Thus, the Court would have to review the use of the images for literary, artistic or scientific 
worth on a case-by-case basis.
The reasoning applied in Ferber can be applied to the CPPA of 1996 and was applied by 
four circuit courts. Like the statute in Ferber, the CPPA is aimed at hard core pornography that 
includes depictions of sexual intercourse, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals, etc.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (2000). The CPPA does not apply to the “innocuous depiction of a minor”. 
Sen. Rpt. 104-358 at 20. In addition, the CPPA applies to visual materials but does not cover 
drawings, cartoons, sculptures and paintings of youthful looking persons in sexual poses, 
because these images are not virtually indistinguishable from an image of an actual minor. 
However, if an adult model were needed to simulate the sexual behavior of a child for a literary, 
artistic or scientific reason then the social value of these works must be weighed against the 
government’s interest in protecting children. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 763. The social value of these 
works would probably be far from the hardest core of pornography. As Justice Brennan stated in 
his concurrence in Ferber. the government’s interest in protecting children “is likely to be far less
compelling” when “the depiction is a serious contribution to art or science.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 
776. Thus, as in Ferber, any overbreadth that may exist can be cured on a case-by-case analysis.
Finally, the court in Hilton was also concerned that the statute would cover a substantial 
amount of adult-oriented material because the phrase “appears to be a minor” criminalizes 
possession of adult pornography created with models over the age of majority who look 
youthful. 167 F.3d 61 at 71. However, as the court in Hilton stated, the main flaw in the 
appellant's argument was its focus on teenagers that are just under the age of majority. The court 
was satisfied, by examining the legislative history of the statute, that the majority of prosecutions 
would involve images of pre-pubescent children or persons who otherwise clearly appear to be 
under the age of eighteen. Id. at 73.
The Legislature has determined that the purveyors of child pornography usually cater to 
pedophiles, who by definition have a taste for pre-pubertal children. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21. 
Adult material would not fall into this category. The court in Hilton finally determined that while 
the prosecution of individuals that sell or possess images of young-looking adults might occur, it 
is unlikely that it would be a substantial portion of prosecutions. The defense is consistent with 
the congressional aim to protect children and not target adult material. Id. at 21.
D. The Affirmative Defense And Scienter Requirement Further Lessen Anv
Overbreadth Concerns.
The prosecution of individuals, who sell or possess images of youthful looking adults and 
any potential overbreadth problems are further lessened by other provisions provided for in the 
CPPA. First, the CPPA offers an affirmative defense for the production of explicit material made 
with a person of suitable age. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000). If an actual person or persons were 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct, then the defense provides:
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[I]f each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and the 
defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material 
in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a visual 
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000).
The affirmative defense goes hand in hand with Congress’s view that the CPPA does not 
and is not intended to apply to images that use adults engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Sen. 
Rpt. 104-358, at 21.
However, this defense does not extend to possessors of child pornography. In cases of 
possession, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed child 
pornography. This scienter requirement, necessitates a showing that the individual purposefully 
acquired or distributed the material, but that the individual did so believing that the material was 
sexually explicit in nature and that it depicted a person who appeared to him to be (or that he 
anticipated would be) under 18 years of age. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 at 75. The scienter 
requirement thus, “limits the scope of the [statute] because the desire for prosecutorial efficiency 
dictates the vast majority of prosecutions...would involve images of prepubescent children or 
persons who otherwise clearly appear to be under the age of 18.” Acheson. 195 F.3d at 651-652- 
Furthermore, the court in Hilton stated that the danger of persons being convicted for possessing 
sexually explicit material of adults that look youthful is overstated in light of Congress’s 
determination that purveyors of child pornography “usually cater to pedophiles, who by 
definition have a predilection for prepubescent children. 167 F.3d at 73-74. The defense is 
consistent with Congress’s aim that the law, “does not, and is not intended to, apply to a 
depiction produced using adults engaging in sexually explicit conduct, even where a depicted 
individual may appear to be a minor.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21.
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IV. THE CPPA IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE IT PROVIDES
ADEQUATE NOTICE AND OBJECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
The CPPA is not void for vagueness because it meets the two pronged test put forth by 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). A 
statute is void for vagueness if it fails to “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness 
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender, 461 U.S. 357. In this case, 
Lawson was arrested and convicted for violating a California statute requiring persons who loiter 
or wander the streets to provide a credible and reliable identification and to account for their 
presence when requested by police. Id. at 353. The Supreme Court held that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because if failed to clarify what was contemplated by the requirement 
that a suspect have credible and reliable identification. I^ The Court agreed that the statute 
does not require “impossible standards” of clarity. Id. at 358. The Court concluded that the 
statute did not have standards for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy these 
requirements, leaving it up to the police to decide whether the suspect has satisfied the statute.
Id, at 360. Thus, the loitering statute did not provide notice and was held to be void for 
vagueness
A. The CPPA Provides Adequate Notice When Examining The Purpose And Context
Surrounding The CPPA.
Certainly, a statute must provide adequate notice as was held in the Kolender case. 
However, as the Court in Kolender also ruled, the statute does not require “impossible standards” 
of clarity. Another Supreme Court case concurred with this principle. This Court concluded 
that a state anti-noise ordinance was not impermissibly vague, because statutes are, 
“[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our
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language.” Gravned v, City of Rockford^ 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). The Court duly noted that
terms in the ordinance like “tend to disturb” or “adjacent” could appear vague. at 110. 
However, because the purpose of the ordinance, “for the protection of schools”, and its context, 
“school grounds and activities”, the Court concluded that the ordinance was clear. Id at 112.
The Court also recognized that there might be situations that arise questioning the meaning of the 
terms in the statute. “Tt will always be true that the fertile legal imagination can conjure up 
hypothetical cases in which the meaning of (disputed) terms will be in nice question.’” Id. at 
110 (quoting American Communications Assn, v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)). But, the 
Court held that a vagueness challenge cannot succeed by merely showing the possibility of an 
impermissible application. Id. at 114. Thus, although there might be uncertainties when 
examining the statute and situations that may arise to cause uncertainties, vagueness problems 
will disappear if meaning can be tied to the purpose and context in which the statute operates.
Such is the case in the CPPA that any interested individual who believes certain terms to 
be vague will know what is prohibited conduct by examining the purpose and context of the 
statute. First, the CPPA’s “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” provisions satisfy the 
standard of notice even though they aopear to be vague. By examining the purpose and context 
of the legislative history, it is clear that both provisions apply only to, “material that is virtually 
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual 
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Acheson concluded that a reasonable person is on 
notice that possessing images appearing to be children engaged in sexually explicit conduct is 
illegal. 195 F.3d at 652. Furthermore, terms such as minor and sexually explicit activity are 
precisely defined in the statute. The statute also categorizes conduct that is banned: pictures of
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actual minors, altered pictures of actual minors, pictures appearing to be minors and pictures that 
are represented as minors. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 652. The statute, therefore, is not understood to 
criminalize any sexual explicit depictions that are not virtually indistinguishable from 
photographs of child pornography. Even if someone conjured up a hypothetical situation that did 
infringe upon protected adult pornography, this Court has stated that the vagueness challenge 
cannot succeed by showing the possibility of an impermissible application. The purpose and 
context of the statute and the definitional language of the statute therefore give an ordinary 
person notice.
B. The CPPA Is Objective So That Enforcement Of The Statute Will Not Be
Arbitrary.
The language “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” is objective so that law 
enforcement can enforce the statute fairly. The First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have all 
held that the key language of the statute is not subjective but objective and is therefore not 
subject to discriminatory enforcement. As stated above, in the section concerning overbreadth, 
the legislative history shows that “appears to be” was intended to cover images, “which are 
virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from un-retouched photographs of actual 
children engaging in identical sexual conduct.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 7. This objective standard, 
coupled with provisions of enforcement, allow the CPPA to be enforced in an objective manner.
It is well settled law that objective determinations based on a person’s appearance or 
actions are routinely accepted in court. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972). In the Miller v. 
California case, the Supreme Court was deciding whether the state could regulate the work of the 
defendant who was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material. Id. at 15. The 
Court held that the state could regulate work, where taken as a whole, “appeals to the prurient
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interest in sex ...Miller. 413 U.S. at 24. The Court further held that in order to determine if a 
work appeals to prurient interest that the guidelines would be for an average person to examine 
the material applying contemporary community standards. Id. The Court concluded that it was 
acceptable to use such a standard based on appearance and that this was an objective 
determination. Id.
As in the state statute in Miller, a trier of fact under the CPPA must objectively decide, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable unsuspecting viewer would 
consider the depiction to be of an actual individual under the age of eighteen engaged in sexual 
activity. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. The jury must then determine, based on the evidence, whether a 
reasonable viewer would consider the depiction to be of an actual minor. The jury must also 
decide whether the image was marketed so as to “convey the impression” that the image was 
made with minors. Id. Both of these jury determinations are based on an objective reasonable 
person standard that can be handled in a variety of ways.
For example, the trier of fact may simply examine the physical characteristics of the 
person to determine age. |d. at 76. If. however, the minor has already reached puberty, then 
perhaps an expert witness may testify as to the physical development of the depicted person. li 
Evidence may also be introduced that explores how the disk, file or video was labeled or marked 
by the creator, distributor or possessor. Id The Fifth Circuit, for example, found that it is a 
custom of the child pornography trade to name a computer file with a name like “Falcon 10”, and 
that the number refers to the age of the person depicted in the file, which might aid in 
determining the age of the minors. U.S. v. Fox. 248 F.3d 348,407 (5th Cir. 2001). Finally, the 
Fourth Circuit held that the manner in which the pornography was created, promoted or 
distributed is determinative of status as child pornography. Mento. 231 F.3d 912,922 (4th Cir-
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2000). If the presentation were such that it, “conveyed the impression” that the image was of 
one or more minors, that would provide an independent basis for conviction. Mento, 231 F.3d at 
922. But, as the Mento court also noted, “it would be the jury’s responsibility to ensure that a 
reasonable person would understand the specific impression sought to be conveyed.” Id. As the 
court in Hilton slated, “[w]hile this list is hardly exhaustive, it gives a flavor of the ways in 
which a depicted person’s apparent age might be objectively proven.” Id.
A further safeguard against arbitrary legal enforcement is that the prosecution must 
establish the element of scienter to get a conviction. U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S.
64, 78 (1994). In the X-Citement case, the Supreme Court held that the scienter term 
“knowingly” as used in the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act, applied to 
elements of crime concerning minority of performers and sexually explicit nature of material. Id. 
at 64. The Court admitted that it was not clear from the statute that the scienter requirement 
applied to both the minority of the performers and the nature of the material. I^ at 78.
However, the Court turned to Congressional reports that indicated that the scienter requirement 
also extends to the age of performers. Id The Court concluded that in order to erase serious 
constitutional doubts about the statute that the scienter requirement would have to apply to the 
age of performers. M.
The reasoning in X-Citement Video, to extend the scienter requirement to both the age of 
the performers and the sexually explicit nature of the material, is the way in which the CPPA 
must also be interpreted to erase any constitutional doubts. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2000) of 
the CPPA establishes that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
“individual” knowingly possessed the child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) applies only 
to a person who knowingly receives or distributes child pornography. As the statute in 2^
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Citement Video, the CPPA likewise provides that the government must prove not only that an 
individual purposeftilly acquired or distributed the material, but that he did so believing that the 
material was sexually explicit in nature and that it depicted a person who appeared to him to be 
under eighteen years of age. Hilton. 167F.3dat75. Therefore, a defendant who honestly 
believes that an individual depicted in the image appeared to be eighteen years old or older, or 
can prove that the image was created with a youthful-looking adult, must be acquitted, unless the 
image was presented or marketed as if it contained a real minor. Hilton. 167 F.3d at 75. The 
scienter requirement is therefore another protection against arbitrary enforcement of the CPPA.
Finally, the affirmative defense is yet another added measure against arbitrary 
enforcement. The affirmative defense is given if the person depicted actually was an adult at the 
time the image was created. The fact that the person in the image was eighteen years of age, will 
likely lead to a dismissal of the cha^'ge. The affirmative defense is provided for those sellers, 
producers and distributors who allegedly promoted, advertised, presented, described or 
distributed their material to convey the impression that it contained visual depictions of child 
pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(c). Therefore, this defense does not extend to possessors 
unless the possessor has less than three images that were promptly destroyed or reported the 
images to law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d). However, the government still has to prove 
the scienter requirement about what an individual believed to be the age of the depicted person if 
they possess child pornography. Thus, if the defendant can show that he honestly believed that 
the person depicted was above 18 years of age, or can prove the person was over the age of 
majority than there must be an acquittal, unless the image was presented or marketed as child 
pornography.
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V. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IS A FORM OF SPEECH THAT SHOULD NOT BE 
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
While the First Amendment provides broad protection for free speech rights, the Supreme
Court has recognized that some types of speech are wholly without First Amendment protection.
In Chaolinskv v. New Hampshire, the Court laid the foundation for the excision of obscenity
from the protection of the First Amendment:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene .... It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and 
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefits that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.
315 U.S. 568,571 (1942).
The First Amendment to the Constitution, therefore, does not protect all speech. Speech 
must have some socially redeeming value to warrant Constitutional protection. Obscenity, 
fighting words, and child pornography are all historical examples of speech that this Court has 
declined to provide such protection. Child pornography has no social value, whether produced 
with real children or otherwise.
The Court held that child pornography is another category of speech outside the ambit of 
First Amendment protection. New York v. Ferbcr, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Court articulated 
the state interest in protecting children as a policy rationale for denying First Amendment 
protection to child pornography. Id at 749. In Ferber. the Supreme Court intimated that child 
pornography is worse than "mere" obscenity. Id The Court decided that a state should be 
granted more leeway to prevent the harmful effects of child pornography than it has in cases of 
adult pornography. Id Essentially, although the Court applied a strict scrutiny test, it decided 
that the compelling interest in protecting children would almost always outweigh First
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Amendment interests, thereby justifying a categorical denial of First Amendment protection to 
child pornography in virtually every case. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749.
The Senate Reports for the CPPA extends the Ferber rationale to computer-generated 
images. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 19. These “virtual” images do not deserve First Amendment 
protection because, “the State’s compelling interest in protecting children is directly advanced by 
prohibiting the possession or distribution of such material, for many of the same reasons 
applicable to the child pomographir material at issue in Ferber.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 19.
These objectives for eradicating “real” child pornography are one in the same for “virtual” child 
pornography. As stated before in Ferber. the state has a compelling interest to safeguard the 
physical and psychological well-being of children. Id at 761. Children will be protected when 
there is a halt to the distribution of images depicting children in sexual activity because it is 
related to the sexual abuse of children. Id. at 762. Whether the images are real or virtual does 
not matter to pedophiles, who will use the images to stimulate and whet their appetites. Sen.
Rpt. 104-358, at 19. Computer-generated images, which appear to be a minor or convey the 
impression that minors are depicted in sexually explicit conduct, are just as dangerous to the 
well-being of children as material produced using actual children. Id
Thus, the production of this obscene speech causes harm to real children directly, if they 
are part of the production process, or indirectly because pedophiles use such material to whet 
their appetites and to seduce children to ultimately abuse them. “Virtual” child pornography 
should not be given more protection than “real” child pornography. In the final analysis, the 
visual depictions of child pornography, as defined under the CPPA, are without the protection of 
the First Amendment and are the appropriate target of government regulation to eradicate this 
market.
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CONCLUSION
The CPPA is a content-neutral statute that is not overbroad or void for vagueness. The 
CPPA is content-neutral because it prevents the secondary effects of the child pornography 
industry, including the exploitation and degradation of children and the encouragement of 
pedophilia and molestation of children. However, even if the CPPA is considered to be content 
based, four circuit courts of appeal have correctly held that it is narrowly tailored to serve 
compelling government interests. Furthermore, the CPPA is not overbroad because it does not 
reach depictions that are not at the hard core of child pornography. However, in the case that the 
statute does reach a tiny fraction of educational, medical, artistic or other protected speech the 
overbreadth may be cured on a case-by-case analysis. Finally, the CPPA is not void for 
vagueness because persons of ordinary intelligence can distinguish whether a depiction is 
virtually indistinguishable from a photo of a real child engaging in sexually explicit activity. 
Secondly, the statute will not be arbitrarily enforced because it is based on objective standards.
For the foregoing reasons. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and hold that the CPPA 
passes constitutional muster. Specifically, sections 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) should not be 
omitted from the statute.
Dated: November 1,2001 Respectfully submitted.
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